FM-10001 Armoured Reconnaissance Doctrine

[Atrovenator]

I’m going to take a page from Canadian Military tactics and propose a completely different order of battle for Armoured Personnel Carriers (Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Close Combat Vehicles and true APCs can all be employed in the manner I am about to propose.) It is certain that the most critical factor in the survivability of an Armored unit is not, in fact its ability to receive or deal damage, but rather the speed at which intelligence is relayed to the operators, in the short window before or directly after the vehicles’ position becomes known. I have taken to establishing ‘Armoured Recce’ squads (a Canadian Forces terminology which emphasizes the use of light armour in an intelligence gathering role.

I am not currently in the military (am currently going through an application process as an armoured officer in the primary reserves), but I have developed a complex understanding of the manner in which different combat arms elements interact with each other. Infantry and what will hereafter be known as ‘APCs’ are eminently compatible. This is for a number of reasons. For one, the APC provides the infantry with a quick, mobile platform allowing them to execute swift flanking maneuvers like classic ‘dragoons’ moving to the fight and then dismounting for section-level engagements. The second feature of an APC is its armament, a light or medium bore gun designed to provide engagement capabilities against infantry and similar light vehicles. (Close Combat Vehicles provide the same level of fire support but with a significantly heavier bore.)

I decided to write this guide (after the manner of a military field manual) as a means of explaining my personally developed doctrine for operating with APCs. This guide is proven in its effectiveness and I have gone several rounds without dying at all, taking the top score along with the rest of my squad.

This is a direct response to http://www.realitymod.com/forum/f254...-squads-3.html a post about APC squads in this same forum group. I'd have posted it up as a 'reply' but it's long enough and different enough to warrant its own topic, in my estimation.


The positions of assignment in an Armoured Reconnaissance squad are as follows:

1xOfficer
2xCrewman
1xCombat Engineer
1xMedic
1xAutomatic Rifleman


FM-10001
Armoured Reconnaissance Doctrine

Contents:
1. Movement
2. Scouting
3. Engagement
4. Combined Arms Operations
5. Platoon Command



1. Movement

a) Formation Protocol

The squad’s mounted and dismounted protocols ought to be evident. The APC moves in a central position, keeping well away from surrounding obstacles/walls/aperatures and corners. When coming into an area which presents directional obstruction behind which OPFOR can hide, the infantry is given the order to dismount. This is to prevent the catastrophic loss of life which would occur if the squad were to be ambushed while still riding in the vehicle. Infantry splits into two separate fire teams.

Alpha
Automatic Rifleman
Combat Engineer

Bravo
Officer
Medic

b) Formation Movement

The first team moves in advance of the APC, one to its right and one to its left. While it is not specific, consideration should be given to ensure that the engineer is closest to the terrain obstruction and the automatic rifleman has the longest unobstructed field of vision. The officer and medic move meanwhile behind the APC, in a position of decreased threat (bearing in mind that an attack can technically come from any direction, it places the at-risk personnel in a position to quickly embark back into the vehicle.) It ought to be noted that for vehicles with side or front-door hatches, the same protocol of ‘two up, two back’ ought to be observed for various other tactical reasons.

Field of vision is such that the two leading personnel sweep in a well-drilled manner for both signs of enemy movement (at all altitudes) and devices which may threaten either the squad or the vehicle that they are protecting. Should such a device be encountered, disarmament protocol is observed with the engineering approaching the device while all other squad members maintain a safe distance. It is strongly recommended that the squad establish a rallying point before attempting to disarm or bypass any suspect device or vehicle.

The officer and medic meanwhile are charged with maintaining a field of vision to the rear of the vehicle.

c) Vehicle Movement Specifics

It ought to be noted for the purposes of this document that the lead personnel should never advance beyond 10 meters from the front of the APC, and that the APC should never pull forward of the lead cordon, but rather must match its speed to that of the infantry at a march. It is imperative that dismounted soldiers maintain their stamina in the event that they need to move to cover. This may seem like a slow movement protocol, but its sluggishness is more than mitigated by its tactical resilience.

The crew must maintain full situational awareness, the gunner and driver both performing 360 degree sweeps of the surrounding area, from their slightly elevated position over the infantry’s heads. It also bears mentioning that traditional ‘clearing’ operations ought not to be undertaken while exercising movement protocol. Clearing is a tactically complex procedure which often places the infantry out of line of sight from the vehicle crew and the vehicle out of the protective cordon of the infantry. Clearing will be addressed in detail in section 3 of this article.

2. Scouting

a) Concealing the Vehicle

As mentioned above, the pre-eminent function of this squad is not as a direct-combat engagement force, but rather as a scouting unit aimed at gathering intelligence and reporting enemy troop concentrations. Collectively they are able to bypass any obstacle presented to them except for those rendered absolutely impassable, either by severe existing condition (Water, Fire) or demolition. Scouting takes two functions, the concealment of the vehicle and the concealment of the associated troops. It is imperative that any units engaged in scouting operations consider themselves ‘weapons tight’ that is, expressly ordered not to prosecute any attack which has not been first initiated by OPFOR. Concealment of an APC is contrary to many tactical beliefs actually quite simple. Parking the vehicle in a deep gully if in a forested area, at the bottom of a desert ravine or canyon or behind some structure in semi-built or urban terrain will usually suffice. Concealment relies on knowledge of probable direction of hostile movement and the positioning of the APC behind objects which will prevent its detection. Concealment also relies on operational silence. The driver of the APC should transfer to the interior of his vehicle and await instruction. The reason for this is twofold. First, by vacating the driver’s seat renders the vehicle ‘silent’ as the noise of a large diesel engine is going to alert any nearby OPFOR to the unit’s presence. Second, he becomes the primary communication to the rest of the battlegroup, monitoring his maps for new ‘spots’ and scanning Team communications for updated information on enemy movements and force compositions.

b) Infantry Deployment

The Automatic Rifleman should take up deployed position behind the vehicle, facing to its ‘six o’clock’ in a manner that would prevent a single Light-Antitank or Heavy-Antitank equipped unit from deploying their asset and striking a crippling or killing blow against the rear of the APC. The engineer should also remain at ground-level, guarding the equally vulnerable flank of the vehicle, and busying themselves with deploying antitank minefields as a pre-emptive barrier using the supply of munitions readily available from the troop carrier.

The officer and the medic should move to the highest available ground (at a distance of no greater than 30m from the vehicle. It is often more productive when the position taken affords a view not only of the deployed vehicle but of its surroundings. If no high-ground is available, they should strive to be as inconspicuous as possible, lying down in a ditch, tall grass, bush or behind some low concealment.

c) Intelligence Gathering

The unit must use the senses of sight and sound to confirm enemy contacts. When contacts are established, if the situation is not dire, the battlegroup should be given knowledge of the enemy’s position with priority. If there is a direct commanding officer, he should be made aware of the enemy’s position as well, at which point he will determine whether the contacting element will also be the engaging element. If there is no commanding officer present, the squad-leader’s discretion will be exercised.


3. Engagement


a) Disengagement Protocol (Unspotted)

If the contact is a target which the squad does not readily possess the capacity to eliminate (a large task group, heavy armour or close-air support) the correct order is to embark as quickly as possible in order reverse to deployment. (Officer first, medic next, engineer and finally the rifleman.) Once the infantry are safely embarked, the driver should resume his seat and move away from the contact.

b) Disengagement Protocol (Spotted)

If at any point during intelligence gathering efforts, the position of the vehicle and infantry becomes known, the safest possible resolution is to have the infantry reposition in an attempt to draw the attention of the contact buying the vehicle long enough to escape. Once the APC has safely withdrawn, the infantry is expected to fall back in a staged withdrawal employing smoke and various other delay-tactics (including demolition) to rendezvous with their transport. Once all are safely on board (using the same mounting procedure as detailed in (Section 3a) the squad is free to reposition at the ranking officer’s discretion.

c) Engagement Protocol (Unspotted)

If the ranking officer determines that the contact is one which can be engaged by the unit, the best way of accomplishing this aim is to place an attack-mark on the intended target, prioritizing assets which can threaten foremost the vehicle (Antitank, other APCs) and secondly threaten the infantry (Light Vehicles, Snipers, Automatic Riflemen and Light Infantry). Once a target has been designated and heading has been relayed to the driver/gunner, the driver should assume his operational position and move the vehicle out of cover to engage the target. Once every target has been eliminated, the driver should withdraw behind cover while the officer designates another target (if any are available). During the first assault, the rifleman and engineer should begin a rapid movement to the flank of the hostile force (if possible) where they may provide suppression and precise anti-infantry fire designed at splitting the attention of the enemy between two separate engagement lines. This will not only theoretically break their morale, but lend to the confusion of the engagement for OPFOR as well.

d) Engagement Protocol (Spotted)

The differentiation between engaging a contact by way of surprise and engaging a contact which knows your position is subtle. This situation is inadvisable and should be avoided through Disengagement Protocol (Section 3b). However, the ranking officer may determine that an attack should still be pursued because though the contact is aware of the unit, it may be unable or unprepared to deal with the dynamic situation. In this case, the infantry should create an immediate engagement line, with all four dismounted personnel engaging at their various ranges. Both fire teams hold their position however, while it is the APC which moves on the flank. This is done for a number of reasons, but the most obvious is that a moving target is harder to track and the sudden appearance of an armoured vehicle in the midst of a squad which has only moments before come under small arms contact is going to almost certainly overrun their position and scatter their own formation. The risk is run here of over-extending the squad and putting its most valued asset ‘out front’ so to speak. The APC does possess the ability to make quick flanking maneuvers to eliminate designated targets, similar to the Knight in chess. However, similar to the knight, losing the APC prevents the unit from relying on this same ability. (Not to mention the tragic and catastrophic loss of both a logistical asset and personnel.)

e) Clearing

Clearing is a tactically complex procedure which is often best left to the discretion of the officer. While considered a strictly infantry-related procedure, the relation between breaching fireteams and the APC can be described simply. The vehicle presents both an aid and an impediment to friendly breaching operations.

For one, its physical bulk is optimal for smashing open gates, compound walls and its armament can be utilized to ‘make accesses’ for entry. Such operations ought to never be conducted lightheartedly, and infantry should never be mounted, but must rather hold a defensive perimeter before stacking for their own entry.

The APC also possesses armaments which can be used to engage hostile contact in the area which is being breached. Once friendly troops have made their entry it is imperative that a ceasefire order be given and observed unless receiving express target designation or under threat. This is to minimize the potential for friendly-fire incidents during the breach. The APC crew should actually maintain alertness, watching for contacts arriving to reinforce the defenders and providing selective, permitted fire-support only.

4. Combined Arms Operations

a) Armoured Support

An armoured reconnaissance unit operating in advance of an armoured taskforce consisting of close-combat vehicles or main battle-tanks is devastatingly effective. Not only can the above protocols be observed, but a strategic advantage is gained in that the Heavy Armour is able to engage targets of which it might not have previously been aware. Additionally, the reconnaissance unit can provide a distraction in the heat of combat by emerging from its concealment unexpectedly. This latter technique is not recommended when engaging enemy Heavy Armour due to the type and effect of the ordnance being used.

b) Airborne Forces

Armoured Reconnaissance units should move in order of battle behind airborne units and before Heavy Armour. Infantry that has cleared the ground and is holding for reinforcement can provide valuable intelligence about enemy movements before the reconnaissance unit gets in its position. This preliminary contact provides the officer with the necessary information to devise his own intelligence gathering plan of action.

c) Air Reconnaissance

Eyes in the sky, the only practical value air reconnaissance presents a ground-based recon team is Intel about hostile contacts, their movements and alerts about potential incoming attacks.

d) Close-Air Support

Combat Helicopters allow a high degree of coordination between sky and ground. An effective reconnaissance squad can enhance its lethality and still avoid completely any direct confrontation by calling on the services of a helicopter gunship. Designating targets with Ground Laser Target Designator (GLTD) allows the gunship to eliminate with a high-degree of efficacy. The only change in operational protocol is that anti-aircraft emplacements and MANPAD equipped infantry take priority over all other targets mentioned previously in (Section 3c)

e) Fixed-Wing

The only differentiation between fixed-wing support and helicopter support is the inability of fixed-wing strike bombers to provide effective continuous support. Their limited payload and high velocity make them well suited to sudden devastating strikes, but limits their functionality for continued defense. They are however incredibly adept at eliminating all manner of vehicular targets with laser guided bombs. One telling strike can shatter the hammer of an enemy’s advance, and the combination of fixed-wing bombers with Armoured Reconnaissance spotters is highly effective.

f) Artillery

Often being close to the fight and finding themselves under combined-arms threat, Armoured Reconnaissance squads are primary candidates for the designation of artillery assets. A well timed artillery or Joint Direct Attack Munition strike on enemy positions or vehicles can buy an armoured reconnaissance squad the time needed to disengage or move into an advanced engagement formation. Obviously, there may be targets of higher value elsewhere on the field, but that is left to a commanding officer’s discretion.


5. Platoon Command

a) Tactical Value

Armoured Reconnaissance squads are as versatile as they are vulnerable. Their mobility and stealth is counterbalanced by their inability to take damage and their relatively limited tactical package. Incapable of engaging close-air support, fixed-wing air support and heavy armour, the squad is best when employed against positions known to be held by large concentrations of enemy infantry. In counter-insurgency operations, their vulnerability comes from improvised explosive devices and antitank rocketry but they excel against light vehicles and in moving efficiently through hostile zones.

b) Strategic Value

Armoured Reconnaissance squads present a commander with a continual supply of field-level intelligence. They also possess the capability to receive logistical support (allowing for the establishment of firebases at positions where they have previously been gathering intelligence.) The APC still represents a capacity to ferry other units to and from combat zones as well, giving the commander the ability to split his elements and move troops to the fight who would otherwise have to walk.

c) Initiative

Due to the demanding nature of the job, commanding officers ought to afford Armoured Reconnaissance squads a higher degree of leeway and permit a degree of initiative in the pursuit of their objectives. Operating under the assumption that a competent officer will not desire the deaths of himself or his men (not to mention the loss of his asset) a commander should trust the field-level judgement of these officers to take their own positions (within operational parameters) and pursue their own objectives. The only matter which a commander needs to underscore is that the unit approaches its mandate discreetly, prolonging both its own ability to gather intelligence but potentially its survival as well. Express orders can be given of course, but armoured reconnaissance commands its own respect as being the leading edge of the information. It falls to the squad officer to ensure that all contact information is relayed appropriately before pursuing any action other than rapid disengagement.

[05grottim]

A hint in the future dont make posts this big as that people will never usually read them lol

[Roborob]

They will if they are interested. Very nice guide Atrovenator, although a group with enough precision to pull it off would be better to form two different squads so they can get 6 infantry. And use mumble and training to make up for the slight communication loss

[Cpt.Darling[BG]]

lol too big post for me i have to read all night
(my IQ is like temperature (C) outside )